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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiffs Howard W. Harrison, III and James D. Robins, 
beneficiaries of fiduciary accounts administered by defendant 
Corestates Bank, N.A. ("Corestates"), commenced this action in 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on 
their own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly situated.  
Plaintiffs allege breach of contract and fiduciary duty by 
Corestates and correspondingly seek refund of allegedly 
unreasonable trust fees and removal of Corestates as trustee.  
Jurisdiction was premised on both diversity of citizenship, 28 
U.S.C. § 1332, and the putative existence of a federal question 
based upon violations of the banking laws, 12 U.S.C. § 92a and 
applicable regulations.   
 The district court dismissed the diversity claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), concluding 
that neither the plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages nor their 
 
 
allegation that the defendants had mismanaged a trust res worth 
more than $50,000 sufficiently augmented their otherwise minimal 
claims to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of the 
diversity statute.  The court dismissed the federal statutory 
claim, concluding that no private right of action exists for 
violations of 12 U.S.C. § 92a.  The plaintiffs appealed the 
district court's order of dismissal, but we agree with the 
district court in both respects, and hence we will affirm. 
  
 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Corestates functions as a trustee for a multitude of trusts, 
managing and investing principal and/or income in exchange for 
fees.  In order to maximize the return on the trust funds, 
Corestates "sweeps" the fiduciary accounts on a daily basis; 
"sweeping" refers to the automated collection of idle cash from 
customer accounts for purposes of temporary collective 
investment.  Corestates transfers the uninvested cash from each 
account to a temporary collective investment fund.  At relevant 
times, Corestates has charged sweep fees of 60 basis points ($.60 
for every $100 of invested cash) for the "service" of sweeping.  
App. at 33a.  In addition, Corestates has imposed an annual 
regulatory compliance charge of $600 for trusts with principal in 
excess of $50,000 ($300 for those with less than $50,000 of 
principal).  App. at 19a.   
 
 
 The plaintiffs are beneficiaries of trusts administered by 
Corestates which are subject to these fees.  They allege that 
Corestate's imposition of the fees constitutes a breach of 
contract and a breach of fiduciary duty under applicable 
Pennsylvania law.  More specifically, plaintiffs allege 
Corestates has violated 20 Pa. C.S.A. § 7315.1(b), which permits 
a Pennsylvania fiduciary to make only a "reasonable charge for 
services rendered in making [a] temporary investment."  Harrison 
seeks compensatory damages of $2,474.88 ($1,874.88 of sweep fees 
plus the $600 regulatory compliance fee).  Robins seeks 
compensatory damages of $713.97 ($113.97 of sweep fees plus the 
$600 regulatory compliance fee).  App. at 45a.  Because these 
amounts are far less than the $50,000 required for diversity 
jurisdiction, plaintiffs assert that the jurisdictional amount is 
achieved either (1) via their claim for punitive damages; and/or 
(2) because the value of the trust res, which they allege the 
trustees have been mismanaging, exceeds the jurisdictional 
amount.  Although plaintiffs have also brought this action "on 
behalf of all those similarly situated," they have not sought 
(and therefore have not obtained) class action certification.  
 In addition, plaintiffs contend that Corestate's imposition 
of the above mentioned fees constitutes a violation of 
regulations promulgated pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 92a.  More 
specifically, plaintiffs contend that a federal private right of 
action exists for Corestates' alleged regulatory violations.  As 
 
 
we have noted, the district court was unpersuaded on both of 
plaintiffs' theories, and dismissed the case.  This appeal 
followed. 
 The existence vel non of subject matter jurisdiction is a 
legal issue over which we exercise plenary review.  York Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 851 F.2d 637, 638 
(3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1005 (1989).  So is the 
existence of a private right of action.  See Unger v. National 
Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1394 (3d Cir. 1991).  
In making these legal determinations, all facts alleged in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
them must be accepted as true.  See Markowitz v. Northeast Land 
Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990).   
 
 II.  JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT 
 Diversity jurisdiction requires an amount in controversy 
exclusive of interest and costs in excess of $50,000.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a).  In determining whether the jurisdictional amount has 
been has been properly alleged: 
  [T]he sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the 
claim is apparently made in good faith.  It must appear 
to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less 
than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. . 
. .  But if, from the face of the pleadings, it is 
apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff 
cannot recover the amount claimed, or if, from the 
proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that 
the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that 
amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for 
the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, the suit will 




St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-
89, 58 S. Ct. 586, 590 (1938) (citations omitted).  Even in 
diversity-based class actions, the Supreme Court has held that 
class members may not aggregate their claims in order to reach 
the requisite amount in controversy, Snyder v. Harris 394 U.S. 
332, 338, 89 S. Ct. 1053, 1057 (1969), and that each member of 
the class must claim at least the jurisdictional amount, Zahn v. 
International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301, 94 S. Ct. 505, 512 
(1973).  A fortiori, the plaintiffs may not aggregate their 
claims in an action pursued on behalf of "those similarly 
situated."  
 
 A.  Punitive Damages  
 Whether a sufficient amount in controversy exists to 
establish federal diversity jurisdiction depends, in part, on 
whether punitive damages are recoverable under Pennsylvania law. 
Unfortunately, we lack the benefit of direct guidance from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this area.  Therefore this court 
must attempt to "predict the position which that court would take 
in resolving this dispute."  Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 
914 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 In Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039 (3d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 440 (1993), we were presented 
with the identical question of Pennsylvania law -- whether the 
imposition of unreasonable sweep fees by a bank acting as a 
 
 
trustee can result in the imposition of punitive damages.  The 
district court in Packard found that sweep fees, imposed at a 
lower rate then presented here, were unreasonable and in 
violation of applicable Pennsylvania laws, grounding diversity 
jurisdiction on an award of punitive damages in the amount of 
$75,000.  Upp v. Mellon Bank N.A., 799 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Pa. 
1992).  On appeal, predicting what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would do, we concluded that "punitive damages simply cannot be 
recovered against a trustee under Pennsylvania law."  Id. at 
1048.  We are bound by the holding of this previous panel "in the 
absence of a clear statement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to 
the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in 
Pennsylvania law."  Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 
1343 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 966 (1991); see also 
Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 (requiring that no 
subsequent panel of this court overrule the holding of a prior 
panel contained in a published opinion so as to avoid an intra-
circuit conflict of precedent).   
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the issue 
since that time (nor has the Pennsylvania Superior Court).
 Calgon does not allow us to examine this issue anew, but 
instead requires us to determine whether opinions of inferior 
state courts subsequent to Packard represent persuasive evidence 
of a change in Pennsylvania law.  In determining that punitive 
damages were not available, the Packard court relied in part on 
 
 
Freedman Estate, 1 Fid. Rep. 2d 60 (O.C. Allegheny Co. 1980) (en 
banc), which held that punitive damages were not available 
against a trustee.  Plaintiffs contend that two later trial court 
opinions -- Lemke Trust 13 Fid. Rep. 2d 328 (O.C. Dauphin Cty. 
1993) and Korman Corp. v. Franklin Town Corp., 34 D & C 3d 495 
(C.C.P. Phila. Cty. 1984) (both holding, contrary to the opinion 
in Freedman Estate, that punitive damages were available against 
a trustee) -- which were not considered by Packard1 constitute 
persuasive evidence of a change in Pennsylvania law.   
 We find that these cases do not represent a change in 
Pennsylvania law, and certainly not a sufficient evidence of a 
change to satisfy Calgon.  See Calgon, 917 F.2d at 1343.  In 
Calgon this court refused to overrule a prior panel's prediction 
that the employment-at-will doctrine existed in Pennsylvania 
notwithstanding two subsequent direct statements to the contrary 
by members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, one in dicta, and 
the other in a concurrence by Chief Justice Nix.  Id. (requiring 
instead a "clear statement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to 
the contrary").  Given the absence in our case of such persuasive 
evidence of a change in Pennsylvania law, we find that punitive 
damages are not available against Corestates.  Thus plaintiffs' 
claim for punitive damages does not establish an amount in 
controversy in excess of $50,000. 
                     
1.  The Lemke decision arose after Packard, while the Korman 
case, decided before Packard, was apparently not called to the 




 B.  Value of the Trust Res 
 Plaintiffs seek removal of Corestates as trustee pursuant to 
20 Pa.C.S.A. § § 3173, 7121 which allow removal in the case of a 
breach of fiduciary duty.  They submit that their request to 
enjoin Corestates from charging excessive fees in the future 
places the corpus of their trusts, each in excess of $50,000,2 
into controversy.  They distinguish our opinion in Packard since 
in that action injunctive relief against the future imposition of 
allegedly excessive fees was not sought.  
 In injunctive actions, it is settled that the amount in 
controversy is measured by the value of the right sought to be 
protected by the equitable relief.  See Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 
167, 175, 9 S. Ct. 566, 569 (1889); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 
1047, 1052 (3rd Cir. 1972) ("In cases where there is no adequate 
remedy at law, the measure of jurisdiction is the value of the 
right sought to be protected by injunctive relief."), rev'd on 
other grounds Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).  In other 
words, "it is the value to plaintiff to conduct his business or 
personal affairs free from the activity sought to be enjoined 
that is the yardstick for measuring the amount in controversy."  
14A C. Wright et al. Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3708 at 
143-44 (2d ed. 1985) (citations omitted).  
                     
2.  Harrison's trust is valued at $902,844, Robin's at $98,741.  
App. at 50a.  
 
 
 The Supreme Court applied this principle in McNutt v. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S. Ct. 780 
(1936), where the plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of 
an allegedly unconstitutional regulation of its business.  The 
Court held that the amount in controversy was not, as the 
plaintiffs contended, the entire value of the business, but 
instead the value of the right to be free of the particular 
regulation, which "may be measured by the loss, if any, which 
would follow the enforcement of the rules prescribed."  Id. at 
181, 56 S. Ct. at 781.  
 While some support would appear to exist for plaintiffs' 
contention that the entire corpus of a trust is placed in 
controversy where a breach of fiduciary duty is alleged, see 
Urbano v. Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 415 F.2d 
247, 249 n.8 (3d Cir. 1969) ("Although we do not decide the 
issue, there is support for the proposition that where a breach 
of fiduciary duty is alleged, the corpus of the trust is the 
amount in controversy."), cert. denied 397 U.S. 948 (1970), it is 
the logic of McNutt that we find applicable to this case.  In 
McNutt the Supreme Court made clear that the amount in 
controversy in an injunctive action is measured by the value to 
plaintiff to conduct his business or personal affairs free from 
the activity sought to be enjoined.  The value to the plaintiffs 
in this action therefore is the cost to them of the continued 
imposition of the allegedly excessive sweep fees.  The cost of 
 
 
these fees to date has not exceeded $2500.  The plaintiffs are 
unable to set forth any calculation establishing that the 
continued imposition of such fees would bring a sum in excess of 
the jurisdictional amount into controversy.   
 In reserving the question of the measurement of the amount 
in controversy in the case of an allegation of a fiduciary 
breach, the Urbano panel was apparently concerned with an alleged 
fiduciary breach that could place the entire corpus of a trust in 
jeopardy.  In Urbano, prison inmates alleged a fiduciary breach 
on the part of prison officials in the administration of trust 
funds on behalf of the inmates, asserting that the officials were 
using the trust money for their own benefit.  Urbano 415 F.2d at 
249.  Given these allegations, the prisoners apparently could 
have successfully alleged that the continued fiduciary breach on 
the part of prison officials placed the entire trust corpus into 
jeopardy.  The Urbano panel never reached this question because 
it instead dismissed the case on the basis of abstention.  
Urbano, 415 F.2d at 250.  In contrast, plaintiffs in the case at 
bar have failed to allege in any way a breach of fiduciary duty 
which threatens an amount of the trust corpus in excess of 
$50,000.  Unlike Urbano, plaintiffs do not seek protection from 
any alleged conduct on the part of Corestates which threatens the 
entire trust corpus.  Plaintiffs only seek protection from the 
continued imposition of sweep fees, which alone do not threaten 
an amount in excess of $50,000 per plaintiff.   
 
 
 In addition to contending that Corestates' future actions 
somehow threaten the entire trust corpus, the plaintiffs argue 
that title to the entire trust is in controversy by the mere 
equitable request for removal of the trustee.  The plaintiffs 
contend that, because a trustee holds legal title to the trust 
corpus, a request for removal of a trustee is equivalent to a 
suit brought to determine title to property.  We disagree.  
Corestates, while vested of legal title, does not claim ownership 
of the entrusted funds.  See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 
comment (d) (1959) ("The term 'title,' unlike 'ownership' is a 
colorless word; to say without more that a person has title to 
certain property does not indicate whether he holds such property 
for his own benefit or as trustee.").  The cases cited by the 
plaintiffs all involve situations where the real equitable 
ownership of property was at stake, not mere legal title.  See, 
e.g., Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1967) (holding 
that in a suit seeking a declaration of title the amount in 
controversy is governed by the value of the property).  Since the 
equitable ownership of trust property is not at issue, we 
conclude that plaintiffs' injunctive request does not place the 
jurisdictional amount into controversy. 
 In sum we conclude that plaintiffs' requested injunctive 
relief does not, to a legal certainty, place an amount in excess 
of $50,000 into controversy.  The mere request for removal of a 
trustee does not place the entire trust corpus into controversy; 
 
 
instead plaintiffs must seek by way of an injunction protection 
from an activity which threatens in excess of $50,000 of the 
trust corpus.  Plaintiffs have failed to allege any such conduct 
on the part of Corestates.  
 
III.  DOES AN IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION EXIST FOR  
VIOLATIONS OF REGULATIONS PROMULGATED  
PURSUANT TO 12 U.S.C. § 92a?       
 
 Section 92a provides that the "Comptroller of the Currency 
shall be authorized and empowered to grant by special permit to 
national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of 
State or local law, the right to act as trustee. . . ."  12 
U.S.C. § 92a.  Plaintiffs have pled violations of regulations 
promulgated pursuant to § 92a, namely 12 C.F.R. § 9.15 which 
allegedly requires a bank to charge a reasonable fee when 
sweeping, and 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(12) which places limits on the 
amount a bank can charge to a collective investment fund.  
Plaintiffs contend that a cause of action exists for violations 
of § 92a and corresponding regulations by way of the private 
right of action which has been implied into 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) for 
violations of the National Bank Act.  See Chesbrough v. Woodward, 
244 U.S. 72, 37 S. Ct. 579 (1916).  Alternatively, plaintiffs 
maintain that a private right of action exists independently 
under § 92a.    
 We do not write on tabula rasa.  The First and the Fifth 
Circuits have already written - and divided - on the question 
 
 
whether a private implied right of action exists for violations 
of § 92a and accompanying regulations.  In B.C. Recreational 
Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank, 639 F.2d 828, 833 n.10 (1st Cir. 
1981), the First Circuit posited in dicta that an implied right 
of action could be found to exist through § 93 "for violations of 
the National Bank Act, including § 92a(a)."  The B.C. Indus. 
court failed to fully consider, however, whether § 92a was in 
fact enacted as part of the National Bank Act.  In Blaney v. 
Florida Nat'l Bank, 357 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1966), the Fifth 
Circuit, in a more detailed analysis, concluded that a private 
right of action did not exist for violations of § 92a.  The 
Blaney court failed to consider, however, the possibility that a 
private right of action could exist through § 93(a).  As will be 
seen, the relationship of § 92a to § 93(a) and the National Bank 
Act is dispositive. 
 
 A.  Can a Private Cause of Action Exist Through § 93(a) for 
a Violation of § 92a Regulations? 
 
 The plaintiffs maintain that a cause of action exists for 
violations of § 92a and corresponding regulations by way of the 
private right of action which has been implied into § 93(a).  See 
Chesbrough v. Woodward, 244 U.S. at 78, 37 S. Ct. at 582 (finding 
an implied private cause of action under the predecessor to § 
93(a)).  Section 93(a) provides in pertinent part that if "the 
directors of any national banking association shall knowingly 
violate or knowingly permit . . . [a] violat[ion] . . . [of] any 
 
 
of the provisions of title 62 of the Revised Statutes [the 
National Bank Act] . . . [such] director . . . shall be held 
liable. . . ."  12 U.S.C. § 93(a). 
 The implied right of action under § 93(a), first established 
by the Supreme Court in Chesbrough, has been recognized and 
applied to various provisions of the National Bank Act.  See 
Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 932 (11th Cir. 1987); Durante 
Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d 239, 243 (2d 
Cir. 1985); Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536, 1540 (6th Cir. 
1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1125 (1985); Harmsen v. Smith, 542 
F.2d 496, 499-500 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 464 U.S. 822 
(1983).  It should be noted, however, that the implied private 
right of action recognized in Chesbrough relates only to § 93(a), 
given that until 1978, Section 93 of the National Bank Act 
consisted only of the paragraph which is now § 93(a).  Whether an 
implied right of action exists for an alleged violation of § 92a 
via the implied right of § 93(a) will depend upon whether § 92a 
was enacted as part of the National Bank Act.3  Section 92a was 
enacted on September 28, 1962 as Public Law 87-722 in order to 
transfer regulatory authority over the fiduciary operations of 
national banks from the Federal Reserve Board to the Comptroller 
                     
3.  If we were to determine that § 92a were part of the National 
Bank Act, it is unclear whether a private right of action could 
exist through § 93(a) for violations of regulations promulgated 
under § 92a.  Since we determine that no private right of action 




of the Currency, repealing § 11(k) of the Federal Reserve Act 
(which was codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248).  See Public Law 87-722, 
76 Stat. 668 (enacting § 92a while repealing § 11(k) of the 
Federal Reserve Act and explicitly amending two sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code).  While designated by the editors of the 
U.S. Code as 12 U.S.C. § 92a, the enacting legislation and 
accompanying legislative history did not amend, repeal or even 
mention the National Bank Act.  The fact that the legislation 
specifically amends two sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 
underscores the lack of Congressional intention that § 92a 
function as an amendment to the National Bank Act.  
 Moreover, later enactments refer to § 92a not as part of the 
National Bank Act, but as the Act of September 28, 1962.  See Act 
of March 31, 1980, Pub L. 96-221, Title VII § 704, 94 Stat. 187 
(1980) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 92(a)(k)); Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, Title IV § 
424(g), 96 Stat. 1523 (1982) (codified as an amendment to 12 
U.S.C. § 93(b)) (referring to "the provisions of Title 62 of the 
Revised Statutes [the National Banking Act] or any of the 
provisions of section 92a of this title" (emphasis added)).  For 
these reasons, we find that § 92a was not enacted as part of the 
National Bank Act, and hence we conclude that no private cause of 





 B.  No Implied Right of Action Exists under § 92a. 
 Since § 92a was not enacted as part of the National Bank 
Act, a private right of action can only exist for violations of 
regulations promulgated under § 92a if a right of action can be 
implied under § 92a pursuant to the Supreme Court's four factor 
test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975).  In 
deciding whether an implied right of action exists for a 
violation of regulations, we must first determine "whether the 
statute under which the rule was promulgated properly permits the 
implication of a private right of action . . . under Cort v. Ash 
and its progeny."  Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 
Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 935 
(1985).4  Obviously, the regulations cannot themselves aid in 
answering the question whether a private right of action exists 
under the enabling statute.  See Smith v. Dearborn Financial 
Services, Inc., 982 F.2d 976, 979 (6th Cir. 1993); Marshall v. 
Gibson's Products, Inc., 584 F.2d 668, 677-78 & n. 16 (5th Cir. 
1978) (holding that an implied private cause of action can be 
implied only from a statute and not from regulations, since the 
authority to create federal jurisdiction lies solely with 
Congress).     
                     
4.  In order to imply a private cause of action for a regulatory 
violation, we would also have to conclude both that (1) the 
regulation was properly within the scope of the enabling statute, 
and (2) the private right of action would further the purpose of 
the enabling statute.  Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 947. 
 
 
 Under Cort v. Ash we are required to examine four factors in 
determining whether to imply a private right of action under a 
federal statute: (1) whether plaintiffs are part of the class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there 
was any indication of Congressional intent to deny or create a 
private remedy; (3) whether implication of a private remedy is 
consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) 
whether the matter is traditionally one relegated to the states.  
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S. Ct. at 2088.   Courts that 
have already considered the matter, have concluded that "it is 
doubtful that plaintiffs could meet the test of Cort v. Ash" in 
establishing an implied private right of action under § 92a.  
B.C. Indus., 639 F.2d at 833 n.10; Thompson v. Kerr, 555 F. Supp. 
1090, 1098 (S.D. Ohio 1982).  
 Supreme Court precedent has established that the second Cort 
v. Ash factor, legislative intent, is entitled to the greatest 
weight in the calculus.  Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 
560, 575, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1979).  Specifically, a lack of 
evidence of legislative intent to create a private right of 
action, either express of by implication, can by itself provide 
the answer that a private right of action should not be implied.  
See Touche, 442 U.S. at 571-76, 99 S. Ct. at 2486-89 ("[I]mplying 
a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence 
is a hazardous enterprise, at best.").   
 
 
 The legislative history accompanying § 92a and its 
predecessor is void of any indication that Congress intended to 
create a private remedy.  No court had ever recognized a private 
right of action under the predecessor statute to § 92a,5 and in 
enacting § 92a, Congress explicitly stated that "[n]o change 
would be made from the substantive provisions of section 11(k) 
[the predecessor statute of the Federal Reserve Act] other than 
the transfer of authority, so that there is no alteration of 
existing law regarding national banks acting in fiduciary 
capacities."  87th Congress, 2d Sess., S Rep. No. 2039, 1962 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. Rep. 2735; see also Investment Co. Institute v. 
Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 621-22, 91 S. Ct. 1091, 1094 (1971) ("In 1962 
Congress transferred jurisdiction over most of the trust 
activities of national banks from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System to the Comptroller of the Currency, 
without modifying any provision of substantive law.").  Given 
that no private cause of action existed under § 92a's predecessor 
and Congress expressly intended not to change the substantive 
law, we conclude that Congress did not intend to create a private 
cause of action when it enacted § 92a. 
 An evaluation of the remaining three Cort v. Ash factors 
also leads us to decline to recognize a private right of action.  
                     
5.  The predecessor statute, 12 U.S.C. § 248 (formerly § 11(k)) 
vested the authority to regulate the fiduciary operations of 




First, no indication exists that plaintiffs are part of a class 
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.  Congress 
enacted the predecessor to § 92a merely to place national banks 
on equal footing with state banks in the performance of trust 
functions.  Blaney, 357 F.2d at 30 ("This is obvious from the 
most cursory reading of . . . 12 U.S.C. § 92a.").  Given this 
purpose, it appears that the statute was not enacted for the 
benefit of any particular identified class, other than arguably 
national banks.    
 Under the third Cort v. Ash factor we ask whether the 
implication of a private remedy is consistent with the underlying 
purpose of the statute -- to place national banks on equal 
footing with state banks in the performance of trust functions.  
In the enacting legislation (in what is now § 92a(k)), Congress 
created a detailed remedial provision.  This section provides 
that in the event the Comptroller determines that a national bank 
unlawfully exercised the granted fiduciary powers, the 
Comptroller should, following specified procedures (i.e. by 
providing notice and a hearing), revoke the trust powers granted 
by statute.  12 U.S.C. § 92a(k)(1).  If the bank's fiduciary 
powers were revoked subject to these procedures, the bank could 
then obtain direct judicial review by a federal appellate court.  
12 U.S.C. § 92a(k)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h).  We find that this 
carefully reticulated enforcement mechanism would not be enhanced 
by the implication of a private right of action.  More 
 
 
specifically, the Congressional grant of enforcement power to the 
Comptroller, head of the federal agency created and empowered by 
Congress to develop and exercise expertise in this area,6 would 
not be furthered by allowing a court, as opposed to the 
Comptroller, to make the initial determination whether a bank had 
engaged in conduct inconsistent with the statute.  
 Under the fourth and final Cort factor we must ask whether 
the matter is one traditionally relegated to the states.  One is 
hard pressed to imagine an area of law more traditionally a 
province of state law, than the law of trust and estates.  
Implying a private right of action under § 92a could effectively 
federalize a not insignificant portion of state trust and estate 
law, and burden federal courts with numerous cases involving 
disputes between trust beneficaries and national banks, a most 
untoward result.  We do not believe that Congress could have 
intended such a result by its enactment of § 92a.7  
                     
6.  See Central Nat'l Bank v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 
912 F.2d 897, 905 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[B]anks are his [the 
Comptroller's] wards, and his only wards."). 
7.  Because we find that no private right of action exists for 
violations of § 92a, we need not address the validity of 
Corestate's claim that, in the area of trusts and estates, the 
federal court should abstain out of deference to the state 
Orphans Court's expertise.  See Ryan v. First Pennsylvania 
Banking & Trust Co., 519 F.2d 572, 575 (3d Cir. 1975); Reichman 
v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 465 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1972).  
However like the Fifth Circuit in Blaney, our decision is 
reinforced by the understanding that the law of trusts and 




 In sum, all four Cort v. Ash factors militate against the 
plaintiffs' position.  Accordingly, we conclude that no private 
right of action should be implied under § 92a. 
 
 IV. CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the district court's order granting 
Corestate's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to 
purported federal claims and for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction as to all remaining claims.  Additionally, the 
district court's order denying plaintiffs motion to enjoin 
commencement of trust accountings in Pennsylvania Orphans' Court, 
which the plaintiffs have also appealed, will likewise be 
affirmed.  
 ______________________________ 
